The War of Paraguay: Supplement 3, Brazilian Politics of the Mid-19th Century

Overview of the Government

The constitution of the Empire of Brazil stated that “The representatives of the Brazilian Nation are the Emperor, and the General Assembly.” [Art. 11. Os Representantes da Nação Brazileira são o Imperador, e a Assembléa Geral.] In this way, the Empire of Brazil was a constitutional monarchy, wherein the Emperor and the Parliament were servants of the people of the empire. The idea was that emperor was the enduring, big-picture ruler (the “permanent will” as Nabuco says in Um Estadista [vontade permanente]), while the General Assembly attended more to the day to day concerns of the state.

The Emperor appointed judges, magistrates, senators, provincial presidents, ministers of state, and eventually the President of the Council of Ministers—a position similar to Prime Minister. The Emperor was responsible for sanctioning laws in order for them to go into effect, though parliament could force a bill into law if it was voted through by two consecutive legislatures. The Emperor could also commute sentences and grant amnesty.

While it’s wrong to say that the emperor was just a figurehead, certainly the General Assembly was the main governing body of the Empire. It consisted of the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house) and the Senate (upper house.) The General Assembly (which is alternately referred to as “parliament” and “the legislature”) held the power of the purse, power to modify, suspend, and enact laws, control of the military, and power to create government offices.

The Senate was composed of 50 members, each serving lifelong terms, with provinces each having a certain number of senators representing them, based on population. They were appointed by the emperor, however the emperor had to choose from the three candidates who garnered the most votes from the citizens of whichever province.

The Chamber of Deputies was elected (pretty much) by Brazilian voters—specifically men who made above a nominal amount of annual income—for four-year terms. There were 102 deputies, also distributed proportionally based on population.

Executive power was effectively split between the Emperor and the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers (also called the “cabinet”) was a group of politicians appointed by the emperor to run specific ministries—Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of the Navy, Ministry of the Treasury, etc. Eventually, however, the emperor would nominate one President of the Council of Ministers (sometimes called the “prime minister”) to head this council, and allow this president to appoint the ministers of state himself. This cabinet functioned a lot like the government of a parliament, as it had to present an annual agenda to the Chamber of Deputies, and could be dissolved by the monarch (as could the entire Chamber.)

As well, the Emperor would only appoint presidents who he believed had the majority support of the Chamber, and would often dissolve the cabinet if the legislature passed a motion of no confidence. The President of the Council of Ministers also had some executive powers, as they were responsible for diplomacy, issuing decrees, and national security.

And there was an independent judiciary, though they aren’t especially relevant for this book.

With all that established, on to the history.

The First Reign and the Regency

The Empire of Brazil was a very centralized state from the beginning, with no way for citizens to directly elect the president of their province—and right from the beginning, there were constant provincial uprisings (such as the Cisplatine War, wherein Uruguay gained sovereignty.) To alleviate this unrest, many statesmen wanted to grant greater autonomy to the provinces, and—together with politicians who wished to confer greater power to the people of the empire, rather than the emperor—they began to form the Liberal Party. However, this “party” was really more of a loose coalition, composed of Republicans (called “extremists,” and farrapos, translated in English as “ragamuffins”) and “moderate” Liberals. The moderates were in turn split between the Coimbra bloc and the Nativists. The Nativists, led by Diogo Antônio Feijó, were one of the earliest political groups to form. They supported slavery and wanted more federalism, and more democracy. The Coimbra bloc was dominated by graduates of Coimbra University such as Pedro de Araújo Lima (Olinda), Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão (Paraná), and Paulino Soares de Sousa. They actually supported a strong central government, and only aligned themselves with the Nativists and Republicans in order to oppose the Restorationists.

The Restorationists came about in 1831 when Pedro I, the first emperor of Brazil, abdicated the throne to take care of some royal drama in Portugal. They fervently argued for his return to the throne. In the meantime, Pedro II was only five years old, so a regency of elected officials was appointed.

Lithograph of the imperial palace in São Cristóvão, made from a photograph, ca. 1860. Photographer Victor Frond. Engraver Eugène Cicéri.

Not long after, the Ato Adicional was passed in 1834, an amendment to the constitution which allowed provinces to form provincial legislatures and control primary and secondary education. Despite this, separatist rebellions continued, including the 1835-1845 Ragamuffin War, which established the short-lived Riograndense Republic in Rio Grande do Sul.

The 1830s were quite eventful, because in 1835 news reached Brazil that Pedro I had died. The Restorationists, with no one to restore, joined the Coimbra bloc, and the Nativist-Coimbra-bloc coalition dissolved.

In 1837 the new political landscape appeared thus: The Coimbra bloc; the Liberals, composed of Nativists and a few other minor factions, only allied by virtue of shared opposition to the Coimbra bloc; and the Courtier Faction, composed of politicians and high-ranking servants in the imperial palace, who had ingratiated themselves with the young emperor, led by Aureliano de Sousa Oliveira Coutinho (later Viscount of Sepetiba).

The Liberals allied with the Courtiers, seeking to attain power by gaining the emperor’s favor, and declaring him of age as soon as possible. On 23 July 1840 they were successful. A 15-year-old Pedro II was declared old enough to rule, and a Liberal-Courtier cabinet took power—but less than a year later, infighting caused the Liberals to be dismissed from the cabinet, replaced by members of the Coimbra bloc. There was a sharp backlash to this, with yet more Liberal uprisings. These were easily put down, and after being arrested Feijó—the old Nativist—soon died in 1843.

Also in 1842, Pedro II appointed Paraná to lead a new cabinet, making him the unofficial first ever prime minister of Brazil. Around this time as well, the emperor purged the Courtier Faction from the government, placing an unspoken ban on the leader, Aureliano Coutinho, from ever holding political office again. The Liberal Party held power for some time, but in 1848 Pedro called on the Coimbra bloc, now known as the Conservative Party, to form a new government.

The Second Reign

A month later, another Liberal revolt kicked off in Pernambuco, the Praiera Revolt—though it was essentially a Courtier Faction revolt, led by Aureliano Coutinho. The revolt was crushed in February 1849. It greatly damaged public perception of the Liberal Party and paved the way for Conservatives to dominate politics for the next decade.

To put an end to factionalist violence and gridlock, Pedro II appointed Paraná to lead a government of “Conciliation” [Conciliaçao], inviting old Liberals to join in a Conservative coalition. Paraná complied, though there was strong pushback from old Conservatives who believed that these Liberals were really just working to further their own party, not for any shared conservative ideals. Especially vocal critics were Paulino Soares de Sousa, Joaquim Rodrigues Torres, and Eusébio de Quierós. Still, the cabinet (which included José Tomás Nabuco as Minister of Justice, Nabuco’s first time serving in the Council of Ministers) was able to function for years, until Paraná unexpectedly died in 1856. The next five years saw four different conservative cabinets, as each struggled to maintain majority support.

The Conservative Party was split between the Traditionalists—the older generation, critical of Conciliation—and the Conciliators, or moderate Conservatives—who supported it. With the Conservatives divided, Liberals seized the opportunity, winning several seats in the chamber in 1860. In June 1861, José Tomás Nabuco, who had served as Minister of Justice in the old Conciliation cabinet, gave a speech advocating for the merger of Conservatives and Liberals to form a new party which could overcome factionalism. With this speech, which instantly sparked an enthusiastic political movement among those groups, Nabuco effectively founded the Progressive League, which managed to take power in 1862. Zacarias de Góis e Vasconcelos was appointed to form a cabinet, ending 14 years of Conservative rule.

Ultimately, the Progressive League was short-lived, dissolving in 1868, at which point Conservatives regained power. Ex-members of the Progressive League went on to join the new-and-improved Liberal Party, and later (in 1870) the new-and-improved Republican Party. But that’s beyond the scope of this book, so I’ll leave things here.


The Empire of Brazil Constitution — for info on the government
This article from Portal São Francisco — for info on the General Assembly
This Encyclopædia Britannica article — for info on the Ato Adicional
A History of Modern Brazil by Colin M. MacLachlan — for general info on political machinations of the Empire of Brazil, especially during the first reign
And, as always, Wikipedia — sine qua non

The War of Paraguay: Supplement 2, The Uruguayan War

Not to be confused with the Uruguayan Civil War, the Uruguayan War, or Brazilian Invasion of 1864 [Invasión brasileña de 1864] as it is known in Spanish, or War Against Aguirre [Guerra contra Aguirre] as it is known in Brazil, was the the conflict that set the Paraguayan War in motion. With some chapters coming up that deal heavily with this conflict, it’ll be useful to know the broad strokes of the thing, before Nabuco sketches in the details of Brazil’s involvement in it.

The Conservatives’ Rebellion

Venancio Flores ca. 1865

In the wake of the Uruguayan Civil War, Blancos and Colorados alike pushed for a new political culture of cooperation, closing the divide between the rival factions. One take on how to achieve this cooperation was fusión—proposed by the widely respected statesman (though he was an old Colorado, Blancos admired him as well) Andrés Lamas, the idea was to rebuke the old titles of Blanco and Colorado, and move forward without these partisan distinctions, unified for the good of the country. In August of 1855 he published a “Manifesto addressed to my compatriots” [“Manifiesto dirigido a los compatriotas”], which introduced the idea of fusionismo, and was harshly critical of the caudillo sects of both parties. Shortly after this, a group of Colorados continued with this criticism, focusing their vitriol on the Colorado caudillo president of Uruguay, Venancio Flores. Things only worsened when Flores demanded that La Libertad, the mouthpiece of these dissidents, cease publication. On 1855 the dissidents formed the Conservative Party, and took up arms against Flores. Flores fled the capital, and the Conservatives established Luis Lamas as president of the country. During this time, Flores’s minister of Foreign Affairs requested intervention from the Empire of Brazil, which was less than eager to get involved in another civil war in the Eastern State.Read More »

The War of Paraguay: Supplement 1, The Uruguayan Civil War

Next week’s chapter will deal somewhat with the aftermath of the Uruguayan Civil War, a conflict in Uruguay which lasted from 1838 to 1851, and which eventually pulled in Brazil. So, this post should provide the background information necessary to make sense of that chapter.

The War in Uruguay

Portrait of Fructuoso Rivera by Baldassare Verazzi

In July 1836, the forces of Fructuoso Rivera clashed with those of Manuel Oribe at theBattle of Carpintería. To distinguish themselves, the two sides wore divisas, colored bands of fabric. Oribe’s were white, blanco, Rivera’s red, colorado. With this clash, and the ensuing war, the two political parties that would dominate Uruguay for the remainder of the century were formed. The nation had experienced frequent rebellions and insurrections by caudillos—military leaders with spheres of influence in different parts of the country—but the caudillos were quickly being absorbed by these two groups.

Let’s rewind a few years. Rivera, one such caudillo, was the first constitutional president of Uruguay. His presidency was plagued with insurrections, especially by the old revolutionary Juan Lavalleja. (Actually, Lavalleja, Rivera, and Oribe were all old revolutionaries, who had fought first Spain and later Brazil to secure Uruguay’s independence.) Fearing that Lavalleja would win the presidential election of 1835, Rivera decided not to run, instead throwing his full support behind Manuel Oribe. Oribe won the election, but before Rivera left office, Rivera assigned himself the position of Commander General of the Interior.

Oribe inherited a depleted treasury and a corrupt bureaucracy, into which he appointed a commission to investigate. Oribe also dismissed Rivera as Commander General after Rivera had decided to lend military support to the Riograndense Republic, a newly independent state formed from the Brazilian province of Rio Grande do Sul. Oribe, not wanting to anger the Empire of Brazil, replaced Rivera with his brother, Ignacio Oribe. Naturally, this did not sit well with Rivera—nor did Oribe’s pardoning of old supporters of Juan Lavalleja. In 1836, Rivera launched a revolution, whose first major battle was the Battle of Carpintería.Read More »

Food Waste: Part 2 – Consumption and Solutions

Here’s the second, concluding part of my notes on food waste.

During Consumption

When thinking about food waste, it’s easy to just peg it to the value of the food. This past year was the first time I really had to buy my own groceries. Multiple times, I messed up and didn’t store food properly, or bought too much of it and didn’t eat it fast enough before it got moldy. So when I was throwing away half a bag of green-splotched bagels, my thought was, crap, that’s like two bucks just gone. However when I realize that the faucet has been running all day, I think, crap, that’s a waste of water and energy for water treatment, because I’ve internalized that as the framework to understand water usage. Food waste isn’t a problem because of the dollar value, it’s a bunch of energy expended for no reason at all. So, to throw another analogy at you, it’s not like buying a sword in a video game, and then losing that sword when you die, and having to buy it again. It’s like buying a sword in a video game, and then losing it when you die, and then having all of the assets and coding for that sword deleted from the game, so that the developer has to redesign it and release a patch so you can buy the sword again. I don’t participate in the production of food, so it didn’t hit home to me all the labor that I was throwing in the trash with those bagels—I only knew the value of it as a consumer.

It shouldn’t be surprising that in developed countries, about 30-40% of food waste occurs at the consumption level, which is everything from household meals to restaurants. In restaurants, there are the same problems as at supermarkets re: over-stocking and expiration dates. In households, most cases of food waste can be broken down into a few categories, as outlined in a study of 14 lower-middle income Brazillian families: “(1) excessive purchasing, (2) over-preparation, (3) caring for a pet, (4) avoidance of leftovers and (5) inappropriate food conservation. Several subcategories were also found, including impulse buying, lack of planning and preference for large packages.” So let’s break these down.

“Excessive purchasing” is exactly what it sounds like—buying more food than is need, and more food than can be consumed before it goes bad. Ironically, this over-purchasing is often the result of buying in bulk in an effort to save money, or taking advantage of sales or BOGO bargains even when the family already has enough of the product at home. So the savings may be negated by the amount of food wasted. Excessive purchasing is also linked to unplanned shopping excursions—going to the store without a list, as “Only two of the 14 families studied prepare shopping lists.” In a 2012 study on national shopping trends in the US, the Hartman Group found that 69% of women make a list before shopping at a grocery store, and only 52% of men do the same.Read More »

Food Waste: Part 1 – Production and Retail

And now, the synthesis of some notes I took on food waste while doing research for a story I’m writing.


The United States Environmental Protection Agency defines food waste as “uneaten food and food preparation wastes from residences and commercial establishments such as grocery stores, restaurants, and produce stands, institutional cafeterias and kitchens, and industrial sources like employee lunchrooms.” Food waste can occur all throughout the life cycle of a food product, from before the harvest all the way to the dining room table. With the waste that happens at all these different stages taken into account, the percentage of wastage in the US is a pretty big chunk of overall food production. A 2009 study published in PLOS ONE estimates that 40% of food produced in America is wasted, and a 2014 report from the USDA Economic Research Service pegs the number at 31%. In terms of calories, that’s either 1,400 calories per person per day, or 1,249 calories per person per day, respectively.

Obviously, this is a problem. Food production is the dynamo that powers all of human civilization. If that dynamo is inefficient and losing 1.3 billion tons of fuel per year, that’s a problem. If that dynamo is inefficient and losing 1.3 billion blah blah blah, and all of those 1.3 billion tons of fuel took additional fuel and water usage to produce, that’s a really big problem.

To put it another way, the situation isn’t as simple as walking to the store, and taking a wrong turn, and wasting an hour of time being lost before you make it to the store. The situation is driving a gas guzzler/steam engine beast of a vehicle, and taking a wrong turn, and wasting an hour of time and of gas and water and whatever else powers this thing you’re driving before making it to the store. Sustainable farming practices are kind of another kettle of fish, but it’s important to note here that a wasted potato is not just a wasted potato. It’s also a waste of all the resources that went into making that potato, which, depending on what point of the process the potato is wasted at, could be pretty hefty. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization estimated that, for the year of 2011, the carbon footprint of global food loss—the amount of energy put into food that ended up wasted—was 4.4 GtCO2, “or about 8% of total anthropogenic GHG emissions [EC, JRC/PBL, 2012 Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research, version 4.2]. This means that the contribution of food wastage emissions to global warming is almost equivalent (87%) to global road transport emissions [IPCC, 2014 Fifth Assessment Report. Chapter 8: Transportation].”

How do we arrive at such an enormous amount of wastage? That’s what most of this two-part series of posts will address.Read More »

Chechnya, From Dudayev to Kadyrov

I’ve recently been fiddling with an idea for a short story which would involve a minor war in the future, with ambiguous morality of each side. Separate to that, I attended a presentation by Andrey Sazonov, sponsored by the Iowa City Foreign Relations Council, titled, “Ramzan Kadyrov, Leader of Chechnya: Putin’s Frenemy?” That title interested me, and so did the prospect of free food, but I didn’t even realize how great Chechnya would be for that story I’d been trying to get a grip on. Seeing this seminar (which is available online here), it appeared that Chechnya was perfect. Tiny enough to be ignorable, but  excessively militarized enough to have a robot battalion. At least, to have a robot battalion in the future. So with that lecture as my background, I did some of my own research on Chechnya. Here it is.

Recent History.                                                                                                         

Chechnya was conquered by imperial Russia in the 1800s, though resistance from the conquered peoples continued right up to the declaration of an independent state in 1917, before being taken by the USSR in 1921. Then a bunch of horrible Stalin things and apologetic Kruschev/Gorbachev things happened, and in 1991 Chechen Dzhokar Dudayev lead a nationalist party to overthrow the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic of the Soviet Union. The USSR dissolved in that same year, but Yeltsin wanted to keep all of the Russian Republic—an administrative region of the USSR that is what we now recognize as Russia—together. In 1992 Yeltsin put forth a treaty that granted states of non-Russian ethnic background limited autonomy, which was signed by all but two of the eighty-eight states—Chechnya and Tartarstan. In 1994 Tartarstan signed a treaty to be annexed by Russia, leaving just Chechnya defiant.

Map courtesy of Jeroenscommons
Map courtesy of Jeroenscommons

In 1992 Ingush split from Chechnya and was absorbed into the Russian Republic, and the next year Dudayev declared full independence as the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. In Dudayev’s Chechnya the minority of ethnic Russians, who had long been the ruling elite, were harshly persecuted. Although most Chechens still wanted independence, not all of them wanted ex-General Dudayev to be in power. Thus, there was some armed resistance to the Republic of Ichkeria, which received support from Russia. In December of 1994, Russia declared a full-on war to retake Chechnya, assuming that a lightning-fast aerial bombardment would bring the republic to it’s knees, and finish the war by that Christmas. But it turns out the fighting wouldn’t end for six more Ramadans.Read More »

Beach Nourishment – How

Here’s the second and final installment about beach nourishment, as taken from my research notes for an upcoming story. Last time I talked about what beach nourishment is, and why it is needed. Now I’ll talk about the methods and the costs.


So, how to do?

To start with, the sand has to come from somewhere. Although sand can be taken from inland sources, or even from sand trap areas in harbors, it typically comes from offshore deposits. Other sources include inlets, dunes, rivers, and lagoons. The sand grains have to be the same size, or slightly smaller than, the native sand at the beach for the nourishment to be effective. And if taken from an offshore site, it has to be at least two kilometers from the shore. Otherwise the borrow area will just get refilled and cause more erosion.

When sand comes from an inland source, it is brought to the beach via trucks. When it comes from offshore it is brought by pipes. In both cases, as long as the sand is underwater, it is dredged. For offshore dredging there are two methods. Actually there’s a billion, but here are two popular ones—cutter-suction dredging, and trailing-suction hopper dredging.Read More »

Beach Nourishment – What and Why

Well, here’s a post that seems to have nothing to do with anything. Although this is all taken from my research and notes for an upcoming story, it has nothing to do with writing or reading or anything like that. This is just a post about beach nourishment. You’ve been warned.


So, what is beach nourishment?

Photo of a jetty, groin, breakwater, revetment, or something, in the Black Sea, courtesy of PSDS and IO-BAS
Photo of a jetty, groin, breakwater, revetment, or something, in the Black Sea, courtesy of PSDS and IO-BAS

No, it is not some form of urban foraging, beach nourishment is the process of replenishing an eroded beach by adding sand. It’s done to protect valuable shoreline property from becoming Venice. Alternatives are building a seawall (very common in Europe) or building a breakwater or groin. I don’t know the difference between those last two, but basically they’re large walls of stone or wood that extend into the ocean and collect sediment on the updrift side, like a dam for sand. They’re kind of problematic though, because if they collect too much sand then downdrift beaches aren’t being replenished as much by the natural current of sand that moves along the coast, and might erode very quickly. Another alternative to beach nourishment is a “managed retreat”—basically giving up to the sea and relocating inland.

There’s another thing which I haven’t seen too much written about, called “living shorelines”—the use of native flora to reduce erosion.

So, why is beach nourishment?

Beach nourishment is nice because it preserves the beach without having to build any structure, or move buildings. Sometimes groins are built in conjunction with it, and can be either a series of tapered groins, or adjustable groins—both for the sake of allowing some sand to pass and continue it’s littoral drift. Beach nourishment isn’t a long-term fix though, because the beach is always eroding.

Before and after photos of beach nourishment in Miami, Florida, courtesy of USGS
Before and after photos of beach nourishment in Miami, Florida, courtesy of USGS


Erosion can be caused by damn humans damn interfering, but it is also caused by storms. Some beaches can recover from storms if they have enough submerged sand to replenish them. Others can’t. This is why during beach nourishment it’s important not just to focus on what’s above the water, but also the swash zone—the shallow area beneath the water. A lot of that sand will return to the beach as it’s carried in by waves.

Erosion is also caused by longshore drift—and mitigated by it. Longshore drift is the process by which sand is carried along the current of the ocean due to the raking angle of the waves. This causes sand to erode, and be deposited elsewhere—then erode again, and be deposited again. The process of sand returning to a beach is known as “accretion.”

Where’s all this sand coming from? River deltas, mostly. Rivers move a lot of sediment out to the ocean. At least, that’s the natural source for sand. With beach nourishment, there are a multitude of other sources. Which is what I’ll talk about next post—the “How” of beach nourishment. The methods used, the problems posed, and some boring-ass statistics about the costs of things.

If anyone wants to do some more research into this, I found these sources very helpful —

Program for the Study of Developed Shorelines,

Beach Nourishment and Protection by the National Research Council,

and, of course, Wikipedia.

A Psychopath Starter-Kit

I’ve been doing some research into psychopathy for a story I’m writing.  Not a story about psychopaths really, but psychopath analogs.  In a society where everyone has so much empathy they can not bear to kill, people who are at all capable of the act are sort of analogous to our psychopaths.  The story hinges on genetics, the idea that this society was modified to be unable to murder, and anyone with a mutation in that modification is a born killer.  A bit late in the creative process, I realized it was quite likely I was about to make a complete ass of myself.  So I went and did some research.  Here are a few interesting findings—think of this as a starter-kit for knowledge about psychopathy, with a focus on genetics.

First off, what’s the difference between psychopaths and sociopaths?  Really they’re the same, but ‘sociopath’ refers more to people that are psychopathic because of environmental influences, as opposed to a genetic predisposition.  A sociopath is always a psychopath, but a psychopath is not always a sociopath.

And someone with psychosis is not always psychopathic.  Psychosis essentially means a disconnect with reality.  There are lots of ways to disconnect with reality besides ASPD.  That’s antisocial personality disorder, and it’s synonymous with psychopathy.  Sort of.

Weird semantics aside, what qualifies someone, in cold, clinical detail, as a psychopath?  The Hare Psychopathy Checklist, Revised—or the PCL-R as the cool kids call it.  It’s a set of traits that must be fulfilled to a certain extent for someone to be considered a psychopath.  The traits are organized into two categories, or “factors.”  Factor one is covers lack of empathy, as well as narcissism and a manipulative personality.  Factor two is about antisocial aspects, impulsivity, and irresponsible decision-making.

So, what about the genetics of psychopathy?

Well, there’s a lot of controversy there.  Some believe there are primary and secondary psychopaths—the primaries develop psychopathy because of genetics, and the secondaries because of environmental factors.  Another theory is that the genes for psychopathy are like genes for cancer.  No one is predisposed to growing tumors, just predisposed to a higher susceptibility.  That was an over-simplification, but you get the idea.  Following that line of logic, another theory is that genetics can predispose someone to psychopathy, while environmental influences will determine how the psychopathy manifests itself—or if it manifests at all.

Despite these varying opinions, some things are clear.  For a start, there’s not one psychopathy gene—it’s not that binary.  A study using identical twins with fraternal twins as a control determined that callous-unemotional traits were over sixty percent heritable.  In addition, “conduct problems” such as fighting, stealing, and lying appeared seventy to eighty percent of the time with individuals that tested high for callous-unemotional traits, and a lower thirty to fifty percent of the time with those who tested lower for the traits.  This demonstrated that there is some genetic predisposition involved in psychopathy, or psychopathic factors anyway, and that while this predisposition often leads to conduct problems, it is not a required element for the problems to appear.  So good news, folks—you don’t have to be a psychopath to misbehave!

And although there’s no catch-all psychopath gene, there is one that seems to increase likelihood of aggression and antisocial behavior.  The MAOA gene (often called the ‘warrior gene’) codes for production of the enzyme monoamine oxidase A.  One allele, or version, of the MAOA gene creates an MAO-A deficiency—this deficiency allele is what gives the gene that badass nickname.  A 2007 study found that the functional version of the gene acted as a moderator of “early traumatic life events.”  So if you didn’t have the bad allele, traumatic events in your formative years would be moderated by your MAO-A, and you wouldn’t become a psychopath when you got older.  But if you had the allele that created a deficiency, the traumatic events in childhood would increase likelihood of aggression in adulthood.

That’s about as deep as my research got.  Notice there are no perfect correlations—nothing’s a hundred percent or a definite cause-and-effect relationship.  This makes all these concepts perfect subject matter for a story—gray areas like this are fertile ground for creating deep, intricate characters and fascinating societies.  Plus, it means that this utopia of non-killers is kind of bullshit.  That’s always fun.

Now let me give credit where it’s due.  The majority of my research was done using wikipedia as a hub, and going to their cited sources for more in-depth information.  Mostly I used the article and editorial here as well as the studies linked above.  Of course I’m just some jackass with a blog, I’m sure I’ve made about fifty simplifications, false interpretations, and just plain screw-ups.  This is a starter-kit, meant to clarify a few conceptions about psychopathy and do a bit of analysis on the role of genetics.  More to the point, it’s only the amount of research I felt I needed to do for the story.  I hope you found it interesting anyway.

Speaking of the story, I should probably get to writing it.  Those early traumatic life events aren’t going to exposit themselves…